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ABSTRACT 
 
Although access to the internet is increasingly recognised as a critical right, the 
increasing criminalisation of copyright infringements and its consequent 
constitutional concerns reflects not only an ever widening gap between the legislative 
prescriptions and the broader societal expectations but may also raise constitutional 
concerns that may undermine that right of access. Drawing on the premise of consent 
from a public choice perspective this thesis examines some aspects of these complex 
debates such as in advocating for government intervention.  
 
The research finds that the recent pluralistic legislative developments such as ACTA 
and DRD are forum shifted with the ascending IPRs rights in the on-going bilateral 
forum (such as the CETA) matched by increased surveillance that can be understood 
as issues of voter ignorance/rationalities and the rent seeking lobbying interest groups 
that erodes the premise of consent and ultimately the democratic legitimacy of the 
State. It is argued that the paradoxical neoliberal outcomes are product of lobbying 
and the malaise underlying political consensus. It argues for the return of ‘bottom-up’ 
spontaneous ordering of ‘cybernorm’ law-making as a product of human action to 
address these developments instead of the social construct and human design of 
central government institutions in understanding and addressing the normative gap.  
 
 
KEY TERMS: Consent, Cybernorms, Spontaneous Order, Public Choice 
Analysis 
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ABBREVIATIONS  
 
ACTA  Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement  
BIT   Bilateral Investment Treaty 
CETA  Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
DRD  Data Retention Directive 
FTA   Free Trade Agreement 
HADOPI Haute Autorité pour la diffusion des œuvres et la protection des droits 
sur internet 
ICANN Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
IPR   Intellectual Property Rights 
PIPA Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of 
Intellectual Property Act 
SOPA  Stop Online Piracy Act 
TIPP  Stop Online Piracy Act  
TPP  Trans-pacific Partnership Agreement 
TRIPS  Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
UN  United Nations 
WTO  World Trade Organization 
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‘Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. You have 
neither solicited nor received ours. We did not invite you. You do not know us, nor do 
you know our world. Cyberspace does not lie within your borders. Do not think that 
you can build it, as though it were a public construction project. You cannot. It is an 
act of nature and it grows itself through our collective actions.’  
John Perry Barlow
1
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The normative ascent of internet access as a fundamental human right
2
 is increasingly 
becoming eroded by the criminalisation of copyright infringements
3
, of surveillance 
and the three-strike schemes (such as France’s HADOPI and the UK Digital Economy 
Act) but this also reflects a widening gap between legislative prescriptions and 
societal expectations.
4
 In the same vein, there have been suggestions to the porous 
‘bottom-up’5 self-governance and spontaneous origins of cybernorms6 and calls to 
recognise the premise of consent in the trans-national nature of cyber-space as pointed 
out by John Barlow. Indeed central to the arguments for cyber space self-governance 
and that claim of legitimacy in modern democracies is consent, the ‘consent of the 
governed’ for instance.7 That one argument is the focus of this investigation.8  
                                                          
1
 John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace  <http://www.eff.orgt-
barlow/Declaration-Final.html>. All websites visited as of 15 May 2013. Also cited in Netanel, N. 
(2000) Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 Calif. L. 
Rev. 395. 
2
 See e.g., UNGA (2011) Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Promotion and 
protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right 
to development A/HRC/17/27 Report 
3
 See e.g., Svensson, M and  Larsson, S. (2012) Intellectual property law compliance in Europe: Illegal 
file sharing and the role of social norms, New Media & Society,  vol. 14 no. 7 1147-1163 
4
 See e.g., Larsson, S. (2011) Metaphors and Norms. Understanding Copyright Law in a Digital 
Society, Studies in Sociology of Law. Lund: Lund University 
5
 Macaulay, S. (1963) Non-Contractual Relations in Business. American Sociological Review 28: 55-
67. 
6
 See e.g., Barry, N. P., (1982) The Tradition of Spontaneous Order, Literature of Liberty: A Review of 
Contemporary Liberal Thought, Library of Economics and Liberty; Post, D. (1996) Governing 
Cyberspace, 43 Wayne L Rev 155; Gibbons, L. J. (1997) No Regulation, Government Regulation, or 
Self-Regulation: Social Enforcement or Social Contracting for Governance in Cyberspace, 6 Cornell J. 
L. & Pub. Pol'y 475 at 502; Goldsmith, J. (1998) Against cyberanarchy, 65 University of Chicago Law 
Review, 1199, 2; Lessig, L. (1999) Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, New York: Basic Books; 
Post, D. (2002) Against 'Against Cyberanarchy’, Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 17, p. 1365; Post, 
D (2009) In Search of Jefferson's Moose: Notes on the State of Cyberspace: Notes on the State of 
Cyberspace, Oxford University Press. For avoidance of doubt, the  terms ‘cybernorms’ and ‘cyber 
norms’ are not distinguished here. 
7
 ‘Consent’ as defined as one that shapes the constitutional consequences, that ‘...constitutional choice 
normative implications only insofar as the underlying basis of individual consent is accepted’  See 
notably in, Buchanan, J. and Tullock, G. (1962) The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of 
Constitutional Democracy, University of Michigan Press, p.7. 
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In particular, the thesis draws on the political-economic public choice analysis 
framework pioneered by James Buchanan to draw novel and original insights to a 
selected analysis of recent trans-national legislative instruments that shape what can 
be called cybernorms, within the EU. In examining the question of consent, the thesis 
draws from the seminal work of Buchanan and Gordon Tullock’s work.9 The thesis 
here is thus briefly divided into three parts; first, an introduction; second, a brief 
literature review; and finally, a selected analysis of recent EU-related legislative 
instruments that impact cybernorms.  
 
Research Question  
Consent is without doubt critical in any claims of modern legitimacy and accordingly, 
the thesis seeks to answer the question of ‘Why is consent critical to the governance 
of cybernorms?’ In order to approach an answer to this research questions, the 
following section briefly examines the sociology of cybernorms, as well as elaborate 
on the notion of consent and the research premise. 
 
The Sociology of Cybernorms  
The broad interdisciplinary analytic prism of ‘sociology of law’ (SL) examines 
pragmatic sociological concerns of authority and rationality
10
, but more 
fundamentally perhaps, a reflection of society itself.
11
 In this sub-section, what I call 
the ‘sociology of cybernorms’ is briefly reviewed in light of the positivistic assertion 
of the State legislative exclusivity premise on that knowledge as well as its claims of 
legitimacy based on consent in cyberspace. A critical aspect of SL long lies in 
recognising the issue of the ‘normative gap’12 as David Nelken and Reza Banakar13 
have recently pointed out for instance. The ‘gap’ is also demonstrated in a survey on 
cybernorm practices for instance that tellingly observed that some ‘...stop [file 
sharing] as a result of a fear of getting caught and being punished and not because 
                                                                                                                                                                      
8
 See also Netanel, op cit; Post, Against 'Against Cyberanarchy’, op cit; Goldsmith, Against 
cyberanarchy, op cit. 
9
  Buchanan and Tullock, op cit. 
10
 Weber, M. (1978) Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology edited by Guenther 
Roth and Claus Wittich, Berkeley: University of California Press  
11
 Weber, op cit. 
12
 Pound, R. (1910) Law in Books and Law in Action, Am. Law Rev, p.12-36; Ehrlich, E. (1913) 
Fundamental Sociology of Law, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 
13
 Nelken, D. (1981) “The 'Gap Problem' in the Sociology of Law: A Theoretical Review” (1981) 
Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 35–62; Banakar, R. (2011) The Sociology of Law: From 
Industrialisation to Globalisation, U. of Westminster School of Law Research Paper No. 11-03 
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the social landscape has altered. Young people do not subscribe to the arguments on 
which the law rests and neither do those people close to them.’14  
 
It is a ‘gap’ in which regularity of law as Lawrence Lessig also observed for 
instance
15
 but not just societal expectations but interestingly, that of the changing 
music industry business interests and technological advances. In the latter, most 
notably perhaps, with the increasing popularity of cloud storage and multiple media 
device use saw the need to legally permit ‘format’ changing in the UK where legally 
bought materials such as CDs can converted into MP3 format for other forms of 
portable media players for instance. Indeed, following the Hargreaves Review
16
, the 
British copyrights laws now allow copying and transferring into different formats but  
as the BBC observed ‘...Millions of people have been doing this for years, with the 
music industry turning a blind eye to copying for personal use. It's always been 
against the law but now the government wants to change that. That's after it 
commissioned a report to recommend changes to old UK copyright laws which hadn't 
kept up with new technology trends.’17 
 
This normative gap between societal norms/expectations of the Hayekian Nomos and 
the statutory prescription or Thesis
18
 for instance, thus refers to ‘law’ here as a 
broader notion of rules, codes, protocols and other normative expressions as it ought 
to be, legislation being only one such form of the law. Indeed, it is critical to note that 
social norms and the Lockean (and followed by the latter Hayekian perspective) 
notion of consent pre-dates and precedes any edifices of the State. This implicitly 
questions the underlying necessity, let alone the monopolistic exclusivity of the 
State’s legislative apparatus.19 Indeed, many will recall the decentralized origins of 
the Internet and that organic premise of cybernorms.
20
 These norms formation can be 
                                                          
14
 Svensson and  Larsson, op cit 
15
 Lessig, Remix, op cit 
16
 Hargreaves, I. (2011). Digital opportunity: A review of intellectual property and growth. London, 
Intellectual Property Office. 
17
 BBC News (2011) Laws relaxed on copying music and film content, 11 August.  
18
 Hayek, F. A. (1973) Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Volume I: Rules and Order, Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press 
19
 Macaulay, op cit 
20
 Johnson, D.R. and D.G. Post (1997) “And How Shall The Net Be Governed? A Meditation on the 
Relative Virtues of Decentralized, Emergent Law,” in Coordinating the Internet (MIT Press); Radin, 
M. and R.P. Wagner: 1999, “The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in 
Cyberspace,” Chicago-Kent Law Review , vol. 73  no. 4 (1998): 1295-317  
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understood from the sociological perspectives of scientists as a community as 
Jonathan Zittrain and Lessig observed for instance.
21
 The normative origins of 
cybernorms are thus not centralised by a State but emerged spontaneously, unplanned 
and without the State.
22
 Thus in addressing the normative gap between the legislative 
prescriptions and societal expectations, a necessary realignment towards a ‘society-
centred’ premise on the democratic notion premised on consent must not only be the 
key but also that the notion of consent is implicit and embedded in the spontaneous 
ordering of law emerged through collective usage.
23
  
 
Cybernorms thus refers to a wide body of normative expressions within cyber space 
that may also include a range of informal, persuasive social standards or netiquette
24
, 
such as HyperText Markup Language (HTML) protocols where there is no legislative 
mandate sustained by the coercive authority of law.
25
 In cyber-squatting disputes for 
instance, the US law seeking to assert even in rem jurisdiction
26
 but nonetheless offers 
limited use, since the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy administered 
by the private ICANN is often quicker and cheaper in practice.
27
 Cybernorms thus 
include aspects of intellectual property rights (IPRs), a subject of much recent 
controversy
28
 and central to this investigation.  
 
The black letter legal positivism claim premised on a State-centric fetish of coercive 
threats over the persuasive norms on the other hand for instance, sought to promote a 
Hobbesian state of nature ultimately governed by an unfettered ‘divine right to rule’ 
or the Austinian ‘command of the sovereign’ demanding obedience. The latter clings 
on to the figment of territorial integrity however it is increasingly straining against the 
realism of globalisation, inter-dependency and the permutations of threats, new and 
old, that effortlessly transcend porous national borders. The global financial crisis, 
terrorism, bird flu viruses and computer viruses are examples that come to mind. The 
                                                          
21
 Zittrain, J. (2008) The Future of the Internet and how to stop it., Yale University Press and Penguin 
UK; Lessig, L. (1999) Code and other laws of cyberspace; - (2006) Code version 2.0, op cit. 
22
 Notably see Ellickson, op cit 
23
 Buchanan, J. (1982) "Order Defined in the Process of its Emergence - A note stimulated by reading 
Norman Barry, "The Tradition of Spontaneous Order," Literature of Liberty, Vol. V, 7-58; Barry, op 
cit. 
24
 Shea, V. (1994) The Core Rules of Netiquette, Albion Books 
25
 Johnson  and Post 1997, op cit 
26
 Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) 
27
 Netanel, p. 395-499 
28
 See e.g., Svensson and Larsson, op cit.  
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intrinsic borderless cyber-context thus crystallises the question of ‘consent’ founded 
only on territorial claims further when there is no automatic right to assert 
jurisdiction, nemo dat quod non habet. Hence the simple squaring of incidents of 
geography onto the claims of cyberspace legitimacy cannot be right.
29
  
 
But the question of consent and that monopolistic positivist assertion of exclusive 
knowledge by a social construct such as the State also raise both the question of 
legitimacy and that necessary knowledge in addressing the normative gap. The 
exclusive claims of ‘knowledge’, not least Polanyi’s ‘tacit’ knowledge of each 
individual preference for instance is underlined in the critic of legal positivism which 
demonstrates that knowledge is irreducible to simple binary prescriptive norms as 
Hayek pointed out for instance.
30
 Legislative prescriptions alone cannot therefore be 
reconciled with the complex, pluralistic, multi-tiered/forum pervasiveness of 
cybernorms/laws that now encompasses a burgeoning complex range of legal issues 
beyond cyber contract to cyber-crime but one central to the very fabric of modern 
lives. Hence that ‘pretence’31 of exclusive knowledge that is extended into property 
rights (notably intellectual property law) that is shaped and sustained only by the 
coercive function of the State over genuine market demand raises profound 
constitutional concerns of that consent to be governed as to the function of the State 
and its role.   
 
The almost universal incantation of a 70 years of copyright protection under TRIPS 
for instance is extended without due regard of the different nature of the material 
(whether as a song or a drawing) or how different people (whether in their roles as the 
author, the owner or a consumer for instance) with different cultural values in 
different times perceive – all of which are accentuated further in the complex, global 
cyberspace communities. Defining the universal parameters for copyright protection 
(such as its criteria and extent of protection) must be futile not only because of the 
forgoing permutations but also more fundamentally, it undermines the autonomy of 
property rights without seeking the authors/owners consent. Instead, legislative 
prescriptions are universally presupposed premised on that claims of exclusive 
                                                          
29
 Post, Against 'Against Cyberanarchy’,  op cit 
30
 Hayek, The Pretence of Knowledge,  op cit 
31 Hayek, Pretence of  nowledge op cit. 
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‘knowledge’ or even ignorance. The economic construct of the law thus not only 
become the ‘deadweight’ where private contractual arrangements must often 
circumvent; it also result in a normative gap when normal social expectations of the 
‘governed’ is different and that civil wrongs becomes criminalised.32  
 
There is thus no reason why private, flexible contractual self-ordering agreements 
cannot also address these issues of regulation. Instead, efficient and equitable 
solutions are simply ‘crowded out’ by the State intervention and can never emerge.33 
This is also not to say that the private alternative does not have any mandatory or 
default rules per se; lex mercatoria, the trans-national old merchant law for instance, 
long operated on a number of de-nationalised and de-localised principles, rather than 
the alleged Hobbesian ‘free for all’ anarchy.34 Imposition of a pre-supposed consent is 
thus not only fundamentally wrong but also economically inefficient since the social 
construct of the State and its legislative apparatus is not often recognised as a product 
of human design rather than human action as both Hayek and Buchanan
 
have 
observed.
35
  
 
The Premise of Consent 
Consent (as opposed to consensus) is a central tenet whether in the modern State 
claims of legislative legitimacy over the private ordering of the law or indeed 
assertions of cyber space self-governance. Yet, consent premised on methodological 
individualism as Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (or the Virginia School) as followed 
on in this work, would allude that consent is only legitimate when there is unanimity 
in decision-making rule because the premise of public interest is simply the sum of 
private beneficiaries when all actors (voters, politicians and bureaucrats) are 
fundamentally self-interested in the political process. Politicians thus seek re-elections 
and bureaucrats on promotions for instance. 
 
A key premise of consent in the methodological individualism is thus questioned 
when taking account of the Pareto efficiency, where in the state allocation of finite 
                                                          
32
 See e.g., Larsson, Metaphors, op cit. 
33
 Barry, op cit 
34
 Radin and Wagner, op cit 
35
 Buchanan, Order Defined op cit; Hayek, The Pretence of Knowledge,  op cit 
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resources, one person cannot benefit without the expanse of another.
36
 Rent seeking 
and voter ignorance are also embedded in that political process
37
 and shape the 
legislative impact and feed the growing normative gap. In rent seeking, social and 
political outcomes are manipulated to achieve desirable economic outcomes, notably 
efforts to influence monopolistic privileges through patronages and regulatory 
functions to subvert the efficiency of the free market competition.
38
 In the case of 
voter ignorance (or sometimes voter’s apathy), meaningful representation is eroded by 
both the voter rational ignorance because the potential costs of securing that 
knowledge often out-weights their concerns over the issues at hand as well as their 
heuristics in shaping political choices.
39
  
 
Self-interested actors such as lobbyists thus seek to influence the legislative outcomes 
in their favour – such as Federation Against Copyright Theft’s agenda on 
criminalising private civil intellectual property rights infringements into a public 
sphere of criminal ‘theft’ in cyberspace for instance. Voters on the other hand are 
unable to assess the complex changes IPR legislative prescriptions because of 
informational costs as well as the political process (such as closed-door negotiations) 
while rent seekers seek to manipulate the institutions and processes to their economic 
favour, such as extending their intellectual property rights/monopolies. The result, as 
pointed out, is not only a skewering towards their ‘expressive interest’40 but also 
suggests a tragedy of the commons that often follows since private inefficiencies are 
socialised while social benefits are being privatised – such as through dated business 
models and the criminal sanctions of copyright infringements respectively.
41
 
 
The controversy in surrounding the secrecy of legislative process on a number of 
instruments that notably shape the governance on cybernorms illustrates the case well 
for increasing informational costs to promote voter ignorance and the rent seeking in 
political lobbying. TRIPS for instance was, as highlighted by Susan Sell, first 
negotiated in secret amongst twelve influential US-based multinationals corporations 
                                                          
36
 Buchanan and Tullock, op cit. 
37
 Tullock, G. (1987) "Rent seeking". The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave 
Macmillan. vol. 4, pp.147–149 
38
 Tullock, op cit 
39
  Downs, A. (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy, Harper & Brothers  
40
 Buchanan and Tullock, op cit. 
41
 Buchanan and Tullock, op cit. 
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such as IBM and the phama giants before being imposed onto the WTO forum 
through the lobbying of the US and the other developed economies.
42
 More recently, 
in the case of ACTA for instance, preserving the same secrecy and controversies 
which included the exclusion of civil societies that led to the resignation of the EU 
Parliament Rapporteur Kader Arif in protest, highlights these issues of constitutional 
consent and concerns over issues of transparency and accountability on governance -
especially given the re-incorporation of ACTA provisions at bi-lateral negotiations 
when it had already been rejected by the EU Parliament. The premise of consent in 
light of these developments is indeed a central consideration to the future of the 
governance of cybernorms.    
 
Justifications  
The normative implications of cybernorms are thus vast and complex. The raison 
d'être of the paper is to examine why is consent critical to the governance of 
cybernorms. In framing the conceptual premise of the organic normative nature of 
law, Boaventura de Sousa Santos wrote citing Hayek for instance, ‘...In our century, 
no one has expressed this idea better than Hayek: ‘Societies formed but states are 
made. (Hayek 1979 p. 140)’.43 The social construct of the State and its exclusive 
claims of knowledge are thus diametrically opposed to the organic spontaneous 
origins of the law and profound constitutional questions emerge when the earlier 
unilaterally asserts its unwanted jurisdiction without relevant and effective consent. In 
asserting the claims of legitimacy for governance whether real-world or cyberspace, 
there are also fundamental questions of consent notably when asked from a 
methodological individualism of public choice analysis. This issue is thus timely and 
critical, permeates the very fabric of modern lives and is central to the claims of 
democratic governance. As Nicholas Negroponte wrote for instance,  
‘…We’re discussing a fundamental cultural change: Computing is not about 
computers, it’s about life; being digital is not just being a geek or Internet 
surfer or mathematically savvy child, it’s actually a way of living and is going 
to impact absolutely everything.’.44  
                                                          
42
 Sell, S. (2010) The Global IP Upward Ratchet, Anti-Counterfeiting and Piracy Enforcement Efforts: 
The State of Play, PIJIP.  
43
 de Sousa Santos, B. (2002) Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization, and 
Emancipation, p.363 
44
 Negroponte, N. (1995) Being Digital, Random House 
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Limitations  
There are no doubt a number of critiques to the theories that are used here. First, there 
are a number of critics to an economic analysis of the law and the reasons are varied. 
These concerns however do not necessarily pose serious methodological 
considerations to this research. Indeed, even though Buchanan and Hayek’s works for 
instance represents distinct critical methodologies, they nonetheless draw from 
specific tenets of methodological individualism central to this thesis. Opponents to 
liberalism are noted and these philosophical debates are paralleled in a range of 
sociological, economic and legal studies that the fundamental liberal/neo-liberal 
philosophical tradition presents as the private consent ‘bottom-up’ phenomena on one 
hand and the alternative construct of consensus as appeared to be manifested in a 
centralised organisation on the other. Indeed, in the latter, one notes that critics of 
Buchanan et al questioned the methodology rather than ‘consent’ even though 
consensus is advocated.  
 
Secondly, the Eurocentricity/ Westphalian assumption in the legal analysis or indeed 
philosophy is another limitation but these aspects have nevertheless been crystallised 
into the corpus of modern international law and the claims of State sovereignty today. 
Another criticism is the assumptions underlying a future outcome of ascending IPRs 
following from a series of on-going negotiations (e.g., CETA, US-EU BIT). In 
reviewing both the past patterns of FTA/BITs jurisprudence as well as the economic 
interests of the States concerned however, these issues nonetheless formed much of 
the premise of these treaties and the economic constitutionalizing.
45
 Finally, central to 
this thesis is the importance of consent and its varied nature. Nonetheless, consent is 
without doubt important, premised on modern liberal governance and its claims of 
legitimacy.  
 
Methodology 
The paper draws from a critical Webberian socio-economic analysis of aspects of 
international law making process, a range of socio-legal literature, legal instruments 
and case law in its comparative and framing analysis of the recent significant 
developments in the EU-cyber law/IPR regime, notably on the DRD, ACTA and the 
                                                          
45
 Schneiderman,op cit 
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on-going bilateral negotiations. The latter are interesting because the normative 
ripples flowing from these instruments also shape the jurisprudential trajectory of 
cybernorms despite the legal prescriptions in other regimes such as intellectual rights, 
trade and investment and perhaps because of inter-disciplinary boundaries are thus not 
often studied or understood. The characteristics of selecting these instruments are 
therefore recent EU and of an on-going legislative significance.  
 
In doing so, the textual analysis follows on from Harold Lasswell’s work for instance, 
notably in seeking to investigate the premise of the law as ‘Who says what, to whom, 
why, to what extent and with what effect?’46 in analysing the content of the 
instruments and their underlying raison d'etre.
47
 The approach is thus one that 
examines what the law ought to be and follows from a critical approach based on 
methodological individualism in public choice theory in the argument for and against 
cyber-space self-governance. It is with this in mind that one now examines the 
academic debate central to the issues of consent. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
The Hayekian notion of spontaneous origins of norms has been critical in advancing 
the organic nature of cybernorms but also implicit in the latter, that consent embedded 
in persuasive norms over the coercive State-sanctioned threats to ‘expressive interest’ 
as underlined in the public choice analysis. These concerns raise fundamental 
constitutional concerns as well as a normative gap. The analysis here thus first 
examines briefly Hayek's theory on spontaneous orders and the debate on cyber space 
self-governance.  The premise of consent from a public choice analysis is then briefly 
reviewed.  
 
Hayek's Spontaneous Orders  
The literature on Hayek’s work and on spontaneous orders’ is not surprisingly 
extensive.
48
 The term ‘spontaneous orders’ refers to the self-organisation that emerges 
in nature and has also been used to describe a catalysis for a number of processes in 
                                                          
46
 Lasswell, H. (1948) Power and Personality, New York: Vintage Books 
47
 Holsti, O. (1969) Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities, MA: Addison-Wesley 
48
 Ellickson, op cit; Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, op cit;  -The Fatal Conceit, op cit. 
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human organisations and is not novel to Hayek as such.
49
 Hayek’s contribution 
however can be distinguished in his extended economic analysis of the Kantian notion 
of knowledge and information, the earlier as a complex, synthesised body of 
knowledge and the latter as discreet pieces of facts.
50
 According to Hayek, the 
spontaneous order is unplanned, self-generating, endogenous, a result of human action 
that is ‘superior to any order a human mind can design’.51 Hayek’s contribution on 
the constant dynamic fluid cross-market forces thus eludes that in the market 
economy, it is the ‘price’ as the aggregation of information (in contrast to the 
Hayekian notion of a systemic body of knowledge) that cannot centralise individual 
preferences. The economy or the ‘catallaxy’ thus emerged as a spontaneous order to 
facilitate that exchange and draws that parallel to the incremental case-law approach 
in common law as opposed to a blanket statutory law in the process of norm 
formation.
52
  
 
Hayeks’ spontaneous order however has been criticised by a number of writers; some 
arguing that the distinction between spontaneous and constructed order cannot be 
delineated clearly
53, that legal systems are ‘complex’ systems’54 and the theory is 
premised as understood by these critics only limited to economic aspects.
55
 
Spontaneous orders are argued as a naturalistic fallacy (i.e., what evolves is good) and 
that economic analysis alone cannot therefore become a ‘...general basis of legal 
decision’.56 Indeed to redress an alleged ‘market failure’ (as opposed to a State failure 
from human design) critics argued that some central authority must thereby mediate 
or mitigate that risk and ameliorate that uncertainty.  
 
Supporters of the theory on the other hand argue that a human construct of blunt 
central ‘planning’ cannot predict all the constant and subtle aspects of societal change 
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and thus spontaneous ordering must thus evolve through a process akin to the 
Darwinian natural selection. The critics arguing that the legal systems as too 
‘complex’ are thus not only self-contradicting by proposing a blunt ‘central planning’ 
of human design but also suffer from a logical fallacy and selective amnesia since 
social norms/law long pre-dates and precedes the founding of States. The liberal 
premise of personal choice exercised through ‘economic’ preferences is thus 
spontaneously expressed even though it is only one such facet albeit an important 
one.
57
 Rather, it is more fundamental question as to the constitutional legitimacy of 
the State as an inexplicable figment of social construct created by an oxymoronic 
‘rational constructivism’ that in its claims of exclusive omniscience and its expanding 
raison d'être that is ultimately the threat to the individual’s liberty.  
 
Given the historical trajectory of cyber space development, it is not surprising that 
Hayek's theory on spontaneous orders have often been developed in relation to 
cybernorms generation unanimity and indeed the premise for self-governing. Bruce 
Benson for instance, argued that cyber law has evolved spontaneously without State 
intervention
58
 while David Johnston and Post questioned the premise of territorial 
notion to cyber space.
59
 Some however argued that cybernorms can neither evolve 
spontaneously nor be sustained without intervention from the State, arguing that it is a 
‘myth’ and leading to a ‘free for all’.60 These arguments in part draw many parallels 
to the case of cyber space self-governance because of the advocation of either the 
State or the market in the form of self/private regulation.   
 
More fundamentally, the conceptual premise of spontaneous ordering in law making 
is also highlighted in the context of Buchanan’s notion of consent addressing the 
challenges of coordination in a Hayekian enquiry.
61
 Buchanan  further questioned the 
discourse of ‘social’ (and by the extension to a ‘sociology of law’ perspective) 
pointing out when the term ‘social’ is ascribed, it is often perceived as only the 
government can stake that claim of legitimacy. It thus belies its human design and its 
fallibility as a social construct rather than as an outcome of human action that self-
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governance in spontaneous ordering illustrate. It is with this critical consideration that 
one turns to the debate on self-governance.  
 
Arguments for and against Cyberspace Self-Governance 
The spontaneous origins of cybernorms as a premise for self-governance have been 
suggested by a number of writers although equally a number of writers are also 
critical.
62
 The debate for cyberspace self-governance and those against briefly are thus 
reviewed. Jack Goldsmith’s canonical arguments against cyber-anarchy for instance 
have been widely cited
63
  but are not complete without Post’s response to the 
‘exceptionalism’64 of cyberspace. The three main of criticisms of self-governance are 
made broadly on the premise of firstly, a private ordering dominating over the liberal 
democracy; secondly, the anarchical arrangements and; finally, the absence of 
recourse to redress a ‘market failure’.65 Some writers such as Netanel for instance 
delineate the premise of these arguments as ’cyberpopulist’, which argue for the 
actualisation of a liberal democracy, the ‘cybersyndicalists’ who strive to attain 
consensual self-governance with social norms reflecting the relevant communities, the 
’cyberanarchists’ offer a ‘market of alternative rule regimes’ free from state 
interventions
66
 while others broadly divide the positivist advocating for the State from 
the liberals occasionally delineated as ‘liberal’/ ‘mini-anarchist’ and ‘anarchist’ 
camps
67
. Nonetheless, the debate and criticisms overlaps are considerable. 
 
The first argument against self-governance questions the efficiency and efficacy of 
’private ordering’,68 arguing that the decentralised aspects of digital network 
communication would create regulatory arbitrage and evasion without State 
regulation.
69
 It is also argued that the democratic premise is comprised by a private 
order; some even suggesting a regime of a ‘tyranny of the majority’70 as a necessary 
evil. This argument however fails to convincingly explain why precisely only States 
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are superior organisation to address this defect since if Buchanan and Tullock are 
correct, the latter is  merely a aggregation of private interest in the first place. The 
discourse of framing criminal ‘regulatory arbitrage and evasion’ may also well reflect 
that normative gap between legislative prescription and social expectations but more 
fundamentally however suffers from the logical fallacy of ‘principle of equivalence’ 
as suggested by Post - that the uncritical ‘democratic’ panacea of legitimacy claims 
based territorial governance that not only ignores that liberal choice of consent but 
activity seeking to unilaterally remove that choice to choose is therefore paradoxically 
undemocratic. Imposing that façade of consensus into the individual’s consent derided 
as ‘private ordering’ is cannot be efficient and efficacy since it is premised on human 
design of an oxymoronic ‘rational constructivism’ such as the universal incarnation of 
TRIPS provisions for instance as stated earlier.  
 
The second argument is the anarchical arrangements and the alleged fluidity/ freedom 
of movement undermines cyber-social norms generation.
71
 Yet critics of self-
governance on the other hand argued that the anarchical arrangements of entry and 
exit in cyberspace are costly or cheaply whether for ‘dissenters’ or ‘the enforcement 
of metanorms’ but on the other, they are quick to dismiss that fluidity and hence 
instability cannot create norms hence, only State intervention is the solution. This is 
another logical fallacy, as stability is overstated (especially since ‘instant’ customary 
international law is possible), nor does stability simply equate with norms generation. 
The public choice analysis work would further question that political process and 
interests in resolving these ‘deficiencies’ by deferring to the expressive special 
interest groups in the façade of democracy by maintaining the monopolistic status-
quo.
72
 Rather, it is argued that cyber-democracy and self-governance would mitigate 
rather than accentuate special interest groups because of the virtually unlimited reach 
and diversity that cyberspace is premised upon.  
 
The final ‘market failure’ argument (by that extension ‘e-markets’) that is embedded 
in the Keynesian and latter aspects of the Stockholm Economic School are also a 
similar argument against the spontaneous ordering implicit in the Hayekian view of 
the market. Yet, those advocating for central government intervention sought to 
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impose that claim of body of superior ’knowledge’/ignorance onto cyberspace much 
like a pharmaceutical company pathologising normalcy. The assumptions in the 
claims of ‘market failure’ premised on a market ‘irrationality’ plagued by the 
 eynesian ‘animal spirits’ often falls apart once the premise of 
information/knowledge is discerned. Rather central organisations lacking in a 
systemic knowledge distorts market information through interest rates manipulations, 
taxes and other rent seeking measures emanating from central control. Regulatory 
inflation by adopting coercive rather than persuasive measures, manifested by 
interventions that beget further interventions that is ultimately responsible for the 
proverbial ‘market failure’73 but also the normative gap. 
 
Arguments for self-governance on the other hand, are often premised on the welfare 
maximisation and resources efficiency arising from the decentralized, fragmented, but 
also the incremental networked norm creation process rather than a centralized, state 
regulation premised on political bureaucracy and blunt interventions.
74
 The oft-made 
arguments thus are framed as a question of efficiency and of legitimacy (by whom, 
for what, why and how for instance) is a road well worn. Arguments for self-
governance can thus be crystallised into three premises, a ‘liberal’ advantage, 
community autonomy and its regularity. These arguments are thus central to the 
premise of consent. 
 
The first argument for self-governance is the liberal advantage, or the ‘liberal 
perfection’ by critics,75 premised that self-governance that is consistent with liberal 
democratic ideals. Self-governance advocates for the organic promulgation of the 
primacy of ‘local’ norms in the global, diverse, cyberspace communities and most 
critically perhaps, one that is premised upon individual choice and consent,
76
 
eschewing a ‘top-down’ control.77 Hence, self-governance not only meets the 
idealised notion of democracy based on consent, it is further pointed out that the 
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claims of legitimacy, premised on incidents of territorial representative that lies on the 
government, are not appropriate nor relevant in a fundamentally different 
environment of the ‘real space’ that transcends national borders with its emphasis on 
communication and knowledge exchange.
78
 Indeed, unilateral assertion of jurisdiction 
is fundamentally undemocratic because it ignores the complex infinite permutation of 
virtual communities as with one’s identities and roles. Rather, consent implied by 
human action is ultimately the only outcome capable of representing that choice and 
the claims of democracy. 
 
The second argument for self-governance is community autonomy, one that is not 
only confined within the cyberspace community and its own norm generations 
whether in the ‘convergence’79 or ‘values’ but also a fundamental right to belong. 
Notably, Hayek pointed out that ‘values’ as a matter of individual subjective 
preferences is expressed through the price system for instance on the premise of 
consent.
80
 It is also a key facet of the individual’s choice/ value in the cyberspace 
context that the potential is fully expressed. As Negroponte argued ‘…values of a 
nation-state will give way to those of... electronic communities…socialize in digital 
neighborhoods in which physical space will be irrelevant’.81 State regulation is argued 
thus as a ‘colonial’82 usurpation of norms in the cyberspace as a self-defining 
community and that right to community autonomy.
83
  
 
This leads to the third argument for self-governance of regularity in that self-
governance produces a more systematic reflection of the norms relevant to its 
community. The persuasive rather than coercive ‘bottom-up’ approach emerged from 
the culmination of consensus is thus intrinsically and more appropriate to the 
governance of the cyber-community not only it is premised on consent (since one is 
freer to choose without coercion) but also it is a product of human action. The 
premised of human action that premised on self-governance consent, notably in the 
context of cyber-space, is therefore preferred in view of the concerns emerged in that 
claim of central organisation of consensus.  
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Consent and Criticisms  
Without doubt, consent must be the founding cornerstone of modern claims of 
legitimacy for States and it must not be eroded in the promises of protection and 
welfare. It would be ironic that in the quest for consensus that the rights of individual 
is subjected to the tyranny of the commons as critics for cyberspace self-governance 
such as Netanel for instance would describe as 
‘...ultimately prove inimical to the ideals of liberal democracy. It would free 
majorities to trample upon minorities and serve as a breeding ground for 
invidious status discrimination, narrowcasting and mainstreaming content 
selection, systematic invasions of privacy, and gross inequalities in the 
distribution of basic requisites for citizenship in the information age. 
84
  
 
Critics of self-governance thus first argued that the anarchical arrangements premised 
on the individual consent is must be superseded by the rights of the majority; in the 
latter not only paradoxically subverting the premise of consent as its basis but also, 
secondly; presents a fallacy of ‘governance’ is solely limited to the remit of 
governments, even though it is not clear how and only why governments are the 
exclusive guardians of ‘liberal democracy’ because government actors/measures can 
be as illiberal and are as capable of committing atrocities. In prescribing an act of 
unilateral assertion of territorial sovereignty which is ‘inimical to the ideals of liberal 
democracy’ to the claims of protecting democracy is itself ultimately inimical and 
contradicting. Epithets such as ‘anarchist’85 like thus often sought to skew the 
discourse and silent a critical and constructive debate in questioning that claims of 
legitimacy.
86
 
 
The criticisms of public choice thus parallel cyber-anarchism. Critics such as Amartya 
Sen, whilst already recognising the unanimity criterion for collective choice 
nonetheless notably questioned that Pareto-principle premise.
87
 Others such Netanel 
argued that Buchanan and Tullock as fundamentally undemocratic.
88
 The latter was 
derided as liberal heretics that do not subscribe to a particular panacea of a ‘tyranny of 
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majority’89 argued that the heuristic of consensus over consent that must be applied in 
all circumstances, even if in the context of the borderless cyberspace. The latter 
premise of a ‘social contract’ is thus imposed, contrary to its premise of ‘consent’ as 
with the claims of cyberspace sovereignty. More fundamentally, those advocating 
government interventions subverted that awkward question of legitimacy and its 
justification of territorial assertions as if cyber space is simply another physical 
territory (as indeed, it is possible for one to be a citizen of more than one country for 
instance) not just the exceptional nature of cyberspace as Post pointed out.
90
  
 
Critics of public choice have also sought to link the conceptual premise of unanimity 
premised on the Stockholm School. The latter is premised on the seminal works of 
Knut Wicksell and latter, of Erik Lindhal on the central welfare provisions to its 
efficiencies and effectiveness. It is also further argued that in practice unanimous 
consent is difficult, vulnerable to hold outs and opportunistic bargaining for instance. 
Hence although cyberspace is argued to facilitate collective bargaining and 
negotiations by the ease of its communicative functions – it is also argued that online 
regimes, nevertheless suffer from the same inefficiencies in the real world.
91
 
Consequently, it is argued that unanimous consent is unable workable in the context 
of cyberspace practice rather than only the theoretical premise of unanimity itself as 
Sen for instance have concluded. Indeed, as if in anticipating to Sen’s criticism on the 
Pareto principle, Buchanan and Tullock wrote in a Hayekian tradition that 
‘…so long as some part of all individual behavior is, …in fact motivated by 
utility maximization, and so long as the identification of the individual with the 
group does not extend to the point of making all individuals utility functions 
identical, an economic-individualist model of political activity should be of 
some positive worth.’92 
 
The arguments for government interventions are thus selective, self-serving and 
contradictory. Critics of cyber-space self-governance have similar criticisms of the 
Hayekian theory of spontaneous ordering of ‘bottom-up’ cyber-norms; advocating the 
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individual’s liberal choice and consent to be submitted uncritically to a central 
authority of human design and a social construct that is somehow inexplicably imbued 
with special ‘knowledge’, authority and legitimacy. Drawing from the analytic prism 
of Buchanan and Tullock’s work for instance, these arguments of cannot be right; 
rather that premise of ‘consent’ and legitimacy is tainted by expressive self-interest 
and criminal coercion that not only subvert the individual fundamental rights but 
widen the normative gap between the legislative prescription and social expectation. 
In the following section, these developments are briefly examined.  
 
ANALYSIS  
 
Drawing from a methodological individualism premised on consent to address some 
of the perspectives to the recent aspects of developments, it can be seen that aspects of 
principal-agent problems (of the citizen and political agents) are inherent to the notion 
of consent in Buchanan and Tullock work. In this analysis, drawing notably on the on-
going bilateral developments (US-EU and EU-Canada) as well as the DRD and 
ACTA, three aspects can be discerned that raised constitutional concerns in 
examining the issue of consent in cyber-norm governance namely; the lobbying in law 
making, the consequent forum/regime shifting; and the emerging neoliberal paradox.  
 
Lobbying for Law  
The public choice analysis demonstrate the concerns over the particular skew in 
favour ‘expressive interests’ of specific individuals in specific industries rather than 
the boarder economic interest of the population the premise of consent in a 
democracy.
93
 The British Digital Economy Act for instance, incorporating many 
aspects of ACTA has been a subject of intense media controversy and political 
opposition, a legislative creature product of industry lobbying and political 
malfeasance now recognised by a number of media articles and the London School of 
Economics Report in 2011 for instance.
94
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Allegations of ministers taking a sudden interest following lobbying elements 
manipulating political rules and processes belied that human design in political 
institutions is reflected across the EU. Like in France, the lobbying interest 
cumulating into the HADOPI law (or the French ACTA) and its disproportionate 
criminal sanctions for copyright infringements was recently revoked in July 2013, one 
ostensibly seeking to promote creativity rather than the interests of the 40 or so 
companies was championed no less by the past French President Nicolas Sarkozy 
himself. The lobbying for ACTA, has thus repeatedly raised many different and 
fundamental concerns of the democratic process at many levels of governance, of 
accountability and of transparency. It is thus argued rather innovating to suit changing 
consumer tastes, rent seeking legislations such as ACTA seeks to precisely safeguard 
‘expressive’ corporate interest of the few with their dated model of business by riding 
roughshod over the consent of the individual.
95
  
 
The Buchanan example of a construction company spending its time lobbying for 
government contracts rather than seeking innovation is thus telling in the context of 
cyber-norm governance.
96
 The premise of consent that highlights the perennial 
principal-agent problem of conflicting knowledge and interest within institutions of 
human design thus underlies much of Buchanan and Tullock’s work. The revolving 
door policies of industry and government institutions for instance, raise potential 
conflict of interests as a key IFPI lobbyist heads the ACTA and IPRED at the EU 
Commission.
97
 But the lobbying for ACTA and DRD is old news and indeed lobbying 
itself is as old as the world’s second oldest profession. The ACTA and DRD for 
instance, even though each was ultimately recognised as ‘illegal’ by the European 
Commission, are being reinstated in other forums (such as the EU-US FTA) despite 
their controversial nature and numerous objections in both national and European 
parliamentary institutions. 
Forum/Regime Shifting  
The ‘pretence’ of knowledge thus not only distorts the normative discourse but also 
subverts that ‘general public interest’ in favour of the self-interest of political agents, 
notably in the complex multi-forum, voter ignorance and the permutations and 
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opportunities for rent seeking.
98
 The notion of ’consent’ within the constitutional 
order is eroded by the forum/regime shifting in treaties because not only do the 
instruments and institutions are not confined (nor can be) within the strict remit it is 
claimed, but external relations ripples across domestic constitutional structures to the 
economic interest of the few.
99
 The growing popularity of investment treaties for 
instance often include IPR protection as with trade agreements - and the forum 
shifting, as seen in the TRIPS Plus regime ‘...means that some negotiations are never 
really over’100, one which is as demonstrated in on-going negotiation in the EU TIPPs 
and FTAs.
101
 Hence not only within TRIPS, ACTA, SOPA, PIPA, the TPP, BITS and 
FTAs
102
 have all sough to raise IPR protection even if these instruments are 
apparently addressing fundamentally different issues. The normative assertion into 
cyberspace premised on these territorial claims is thus profoundly complex and raises 
many complex questions and concerns (such as human rights) in these largely 
uncharted waters.  
 
Indeed, the effect of voter ignorance in regime shifting and rent seeking is further 
exemplified by the on-going Canada-EU negotiations for instance which 
demonstrated that ’... CETA adopts ACTA's wording exactly’103 with the ‘...worst 
aspects of the ACTA’104 as a ‘backdoor’.105 But IPRs and the cyber law/norms therein 
is regime shifted to investment (as IPRs are often defined as ‘investments’106) and into 
trade - especially since the US FTA signatories are already compel to the TRIPS Plus 
standards, standards above TRIPS prescriptions. The conflicting political process is 
also often illustrated within EU institutional power dispute (between the Parliament, 
Commission and Council) as well as Member States over precedence of EU law over 
national interest.
107
 These considerations rose in the perennial debate over democratic 
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deficit in the legislative process and the concern over the loss of consent of the 
governed.
108
 The Hayekian notion of knowledge (or the lack of in this context) 
reflects the necessity of constant tweaking of the blunt legislative apparatus inevitably 
leads to regulatory inflation and with that, a trajectory towards an inflation of the IPRs 
and of surveillance in these instances. It is also a trajectory to preserve monopolistic 
interest of the few as often ascribed as ‘neoliberal’. 
 
The Neoliberal Paradox  
The forum/regime shifting in IPR has also led to mass surveillance of the citizenry, 
raises fundamental constitutional concerns, such as the perennial principal-agent 
problems in the political process.
109
 More fundamentally perhaps, the democratic 
deficit is often reflected in the legislative process within the EU discourse.
110
 In this 
sense, that neoliberal paradox is that only certain rights are enhanced, notably selected 
property rights while other rights such as privacy rights are eroded. These 
developments also reflect the distortive ‘expressive interest’ that emerged from the 
defective consent in the political process underlined by the premise of human design.  
 
That neoliberal paradox is further extended in the sense that the privacy/anonymity is 
also available for a price as demonstrated with various measures such as VPN 
services which is increasingly popular as surveillance is ratcheted up.
111
 Like a fee for 
delisting one’s telephone number, the neoliberal paradox must ultimately lie in the 
most illiberal premise of securing private property rights only through the State 
apparatus of coercive criminal sanctions rather than a genuine market need is – as 
fundamentally perverse as asserting unilateral claims of territorial sovereignty to 
cyberspace in the name of democracy but reveal the monopolistic premise of 
systematically excluding consent thereby raises constitutional concerns.  
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Constitutional Premise of Consent 
The constitutional premise of surveillance and selected enforcement of property rights 
undoubtedly raises profound concerns over many issues including voter ignorance and 
that premise of consent. The on-going bilateral negotiations of re-introducing 
ACTA
112
 for instance when already rejected by some national as well as the European 
Parliament circumvent the scrutiny process but also become binding to member states 
demonstrate both the constitutionalization effect  as well as a democratic deficit.
113
 
These instruments of surveillance framed as ‘proportionate’ and ‘legitimate’ means to 
protect ‘serious crime’ over aspects of privacy raising complex issues of democracy. 
More fundamentally these means have also sought to achieve the ends of ill-defined 
‘other purposes’ raising the prospect of an incompatibility with the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. Indeed, the legislative prescription of ACTA is not premised on 
evidence based policy nor legitimate grounds of national security raises fundamental 
constitutional concerns and like ACTA, the DRD promise of crime prevention. To 
justify an intrusion, lip service to privacy is often paid while both ‘protective’ 
functions of the state and the alleged threats are highlighted. Section 4 of the DRD for 
instance notes that  
‘Any such restrictions must be necessary, appropriate and proportionate 
within a democratic society for specific public order purposes, i.e. to 
safeguard national security (i.e. State security), defence, public security or the 
prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences or of 
unauthorised use of the electronic communications systems.’114  
 
Yet, a number of internal EU reports conducted to review the premise of DRD for 
instance have argued that these instruments are legitimate and consistent with data 
retention legislations even in the face of public outcry.
115
 As Marieke de Goede 
observed for instance, in spite of the   
‘…strong criticism by civil society organisations on the grounds that data 
retention violates fundamental rights, the evaluation report concludes that 
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data retention is valuable for the important role it plays in combating serious 
crime in Europe’.116  
 
The privacy concerns by fundamentally shifting the onus of guilt to all European data 
communication are neither proportionate nor appropriate as Rens Van Munster 
concluded for instance, ‘…In a sense everybody is a suspect.’117 The politicised knee-
jerk respond to terrorism showed both limited public discussion and legal 
uncertainties such as not delineating business from ‘serious crime’ purposes as well as 
that the notion of ‘serious crime’. That voter ignorance saw the latter to be as 
‘…defined by each Member State in its national law, cannot be sufficiently achieved 
by the Member States’ (s.21), as evident that the criminalisation at Community level 
was already the default in the absence of any agreed standards. Tellingly, a 
Commission Services consultation for instance latter found that there is no  
‘...logical separation between data stored and then accessed for a) business 
purposes, b) for purposes of combating 'serious crime' and c) for purposes 
other than combating serious crime" and the lack of a monitoring system 
showing "data (that) would not have been available to law enforcement 
without mandatory retention.’118  
 
The limited delineation of ‘serious crime’ from ordinary ‘crime’ as well as the lack of 
a broader debate in framing the discourse resulted in fishing expeditions for copyright 
infringements as ‘hacking’ or ‘urgent cases’119 without establishing the usual 
necessity nor proportionality thus raises concerns such as representations and due 
process.
120
 Without a coherent procedure for data breaches in evaluating access or 
costs of implementation, it is observed that only countries with these economic 
interests will implement these instruments. The problem of voter ignorance has thus 
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led to the skewing of ‘expressive interest’ in the legislative process. The question of 
consent is extended further when the constitutional premise of applying the principle 
of proportionality by not going beyond what is necessary to combat serious crime and 
terrorism such as national security leaves the latter to be a judge in his own cause. 
Thus even with a ‘proportionality’ to privacy121, new developments such as a ‘right to 
be forgotten and to erasure’ and its premise remains uncertain.122 Indeed lip service to 
‘necessity’ and ‘proportionality’ in the façade of democratic consensus belies the 
constitutionalising economic effects.
123
 The controversial U  ‘rnbxclusive’ case for 
instance saw the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) closing the website down, 
raising profound IPR, surveillance as well as constitutional concerns that the SOCA 
may have becomes a ‘personal enforcer to the recording industry’’124 seeking to 
impose custodial sentence of 10 years for illegal downloading. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Drawing on the rational self-interest actors in the political process and using Pareto 
optimality, Buchanan and Tullock demonstrated that the problem of voter ignorance 
and rent seeking erodes that premise of consent. In this instance, it is observed that the 
special interest groups lobbying widens that normative divide with legislative 
trajectories of ratcheting up of IPRs and of surveillance, raising fundamental 
constitutional questions, the claims of legislative legitimacy but also fundamental 
rights. In part, the intellectual property law and its related cyber law/norms, like the 
State institutions are premised on human design manifested in the social construct and 
relying on the coercive apparatus of sovereign privileges and patronage as opposed to 
the spontaneous human action of private ‘bottom up’ norms cumulated by the 
individual’s consent that has widened this normative gap.  
 
The  normative gap is widened by central authority claims of knowledge but the  
normative trajectory premised on societal normative expectations is diverted by both 
voter ignorance and rent seeking as seen in the ACTA, DRD and also in the bilateral 
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forum where forum-shifting and lobbying are rife. Voter ignorance emerged from 
informational costs and internal decision heuristics, such as a full debate post-
terrorism on ‘proportionality’ for surveillance and indeed, the framing discourse on 
crime. More critically, the rent seeking elements from a public choice perspective 
demonstrate that lobbying distorts the legal outcomes distorts the legal prescriptions. 
This is notably underlined by the ascending criminal sanctions of a civil wrong. The 
public choice analytic perspective of consent is thus interesting because it 
demonstrates the inherent problems of the political process in the first instance but 
also in defining lives only through incidents of geography, normative ripples not only 
erode the fundamental rights in squaring territorial claims to the cyber space but 
those claims are unilaterally imposed without consent. These concerns have already 
been raised by John Perry Barlow and many others but are central to the right of the 
individual against the unfettered powers of the State.  
 
When examined further on a number of cyber law related legislation however, the 
normative ripples in ACTA and the DRD demonstrate that the developments in the 
intended forums have impacts, whether foreseen or unintended belies the excessive 
statism pushed these ‘outcomes’ to transcend the national constitutional 
premise/promise and that private governance through spontaneous ordering will 
eschew. Criminalisation of normal social expectations to the rent seeking special 
interests groups is one such outcome. The mass illegal surveillance of the State is 
another. These outcomes would not materialise if there is genuine consent, premised 
on human action rather than human design. This is why consent is so critical to the 
governance of cybernorms. 
 
The potential for future research is thus vast, timely and critical. There is already 
conclusive evidence that the legislative prescriptions do not reflect the normative 
societal expectations on file-sharing in the Cybernorms Project at University of Lund 
and that social norms emerged differently across different net cultures.
125
  Normative 
ripples from the rational construct of the State and its raison d'être thus shape complex 
human rights issues of privacy and of access that erode rather than augment 
democracy as claimed. This raises fundamental questions that have vast constitutional 
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implications that shape our way of life. In a widely cited article, one critic wrote 
‘There is the urgent question of sovereignty: who will do the shaping and 
patrolling?’126 But even in alluding to the ‘night-watch man state’ with its already 
very flawed premise, who watch the watchers? Consent as opposed to consensus must 
therefore be that premise of legitimacy and in addressing the normative gap.   
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